Restructure ATX DAO as follows:
1. Replace the existing 11 committees with 3 guilds, aligned to the three areas of ATX DAO’s mission:
Onboarding Guild, with the goal of “Enabling local artists and businesses to participate in the crypto ecosystem”.
Community Guild, with the goal of “Uniting Austin's crypto communities”.
Policy Guild, with the goal of “Advising the government on better crypto policy”.
2. Each guild will not have elected leads. Community members will organically choose the direction, fluidly contribute to tasks, and get compensated accordingly.
3. Operational tasks listed below will not fall under any guild. These will be remunerated part-time positions.
General Operations, Treasury, and Accounting
Assignee: @MeganKay
Compensation: $40 per hour
Marketing and Events
Assignee: @512mace
Compensation: $1500 per month
3.1 More operational roles can be added as they become needed, upon the approval of a proposal as outlined in 7.
3.2 The people assigned to the tasks above are not eligible to receive compensation via the giving circle for tasks associated with their roles. Nonetheless, other non-assigned members who sporadically help with operational tasks can submit their contributions for recognition in the giving circle.
4. Establish an operational epoch of one month. This epoch will serve to mark the cadence of compensation, monetization strategies, contribution submissions, and strategic decisions.
4.1 Each epoch will begin on the first day of the month and end on the last day of the month.
4.2 The giving circle ceremony will take place during the in-person member’s meeting of the following month.
4.3 At the end of each epoch, member contributions will be financially compensated according to a social giving circle.
4.4 The giving circle and compensation will be structured as follows:
4.4.1. Amount: At the start of each epoch, 1,000 USDC will be reserved to compensate member contributions across the three guilds.
4.4.2. Eligibility: Eligibility for compensation in the following giving circle is based on DAO membership and self-appointed contributions. Meaning that if you are a DAO member and claim to have made a contribution via the contribution form, you are eligible for compensation in the next giving circle.
- Form: The form will allow you to either add a contribution to a standalone project, or a contribution to an existing project. You should only add contributions that have been completed during that epoch.
- Definition of contribution: Contributions are anything that helps advance the DAO in any of its three guilds (policy, industry, or community). These do not include operational tasks such as answering emails, updating the website, managing social media, etc. Operational tasks do not fall under any guild and have appointed people on flat monthly rates to fulfill them.
4.4.5. Participation: To participate in the circle (that is, to award giving points to each other), one must be present in our monthly in-person meeting and be a DAO member. Every member present will receive 10 giving points. Members can choose to recognize each other’s contributions with however many points they wish. They don’t need to allocate all their points in a given epoch, can allocate more than one point per contribution if desired, and can also allocate some or all their giving points to their own contributions if they believe it to be fair.
4.4.6. Recognition: During the giving circle, each member will allocate giving points to contributions, not to individuals. This incentivizes people to recognize impactful work while minimizing the impact of personal relationships and charisma in the recognition process.
4.4.7. Compensation: At the end of the giving circle, members will receive a percentage of the epoch’s total compensation pool in $USDC, corresponding to the percentage of the giving points received across all their contributions over the total giving points allocated for that epoch
4.4.8. Funds Rollover and Cap: If not all the distributed giving points are allocated at the end of an epoch, the percentage of unallocated funds will roll over to the next epoch to a cap of 3,000 USDC. After this cap, all unallocated funds will return to the DAO treasury.
5. This proposal overwrites the following organizational proposals:
- With the exception of the already approved $30,000 events budget and compensation for marketing and events.
Rationale:
Mission Statement and Organizational Alignment
ATX DAO’s mission has organically evolved from what was first passed by the genesis team in our blueprint (November 19th, 2021) to what we see in practice in the organization today. Particularly, since the establishment of the public policy think tank, ATX DAO has progressively become a more relevant crypto policy advisor for the city of Austin and the state of Texas.
Our mission has grown to encompass three key areas of operation: Community, Onboarding, and Policy. We “unite Austin's crypto communities, enable local artists and businesses to participate in the crypto ecosystem, and educate the government about the benefits of Web3”.
Nonetheless, our current organizational structure establishes 11 committees, and our main communication system - discord - has 11 member-only channels and several community channels. This has led to significant operational cacophony and made it virtually impossible for less active members to keep up with the DAO and, consequently, made it hard for new members to engage in the DAO.
Reorganizing the DAO into three guilds that directly align with the areas of impact of the DAO will help reduce the operational overhead of multiple committees while giving members a more digestible way to stay updated on everything that is happening in the DAO.
Decentralization and Fluid Contributions
The current committee head format has led to centralizing decision-making committee heads. Members wanting to engage and propose ideas in certain areas need to go through these people for context, social “permission”, and official sponsoring of any proposal they want to submit. This, added to the communication cacophony of our discord has led to myriad backchannel discussions where only a few members are actively influencing the future of the DAO.
Due to this decision-making centralization, the structure has also created operational single points of failure. If for whatever reason, a committee head is not engaged at a given point in time, the DAO becomes stagnant in that area. This means committee heads can’t take a break or lose engagement in the DAO, for the organization stops without them. Lastly, the tenure of these positions makes us slow to react to less engaged or poorly behaved committee heads. Removing the committee model and elected positions will contribute to a more decentralized organization. Communications will become more transparent and decision-making and strategy will be distributed across the community.
Another benefit of the guild system is that it brings fluidity to the operations of the DAO. Members are free to take a break, to absent themselves from daily DAO operations, or lose interest in the organization altogether, while the DAO will organically absorb their contributions and readjust. New members who want to contribute to the organization simply need to pick an area that fits them well (onboarding, policy, or community) and start an initiative or contribute to any of the ongoing projects.
Focus on IRL connections and community building.
The new organizational structure places a lot of power on the members who attend the monthly in-person meetings. These members will have the effective giving power of choosing who gets compensated for a given epoch and vote on the continuation of any ongoing revenue projects.
This emphasis on in-person meetings is deliberate, and it stems from the belief that, as a city DAO, the ability to get most of our members in the same room is our superpower. This IRL component and the trust that emerges from IRL connections is what sets us apart from other DAOs. This organizational structure puts that competitive advantage at the forefront of our operations.
It is understandable that there will be times when even highly engaged members simply won’t be able to attend in-person meetings. It is worth highlighting that members can still be recognized and compensated for their contributions even if they are not present. Being absent from any monthly member meeting will not hinder members’ future engagement or opportunities in the DAO in any way.
Most of us joined ATX DAO because it is fun. Hanging out with our crypto friends is fun; drinking beers and grilling out with the crypto community is fun; showing off our gains during the bull market is fun, and suffering together during the bear market is fun. The incentives to show up to the in-person member meetings are, ultimately, an incentive to build those IRL connections, leverage the efficiency and trust they bring, and put the fun back into our vibrant community.
Focus on sustainability, prevention of contributors’ burnout, and recognition of work
The central objective of this proposal is to build a sustainable City DAO: A truly decentralized autonomous organization that can stand on its own, that can outlive any member’s burnout, that is owned and spearheaded by its community, all while doing good for the city we love.
To achieve our goal, we need to do two things. First, we must recognize and start compensating our members who have been tirelessly working for this organization. Show them, with monetary and social recognition, that their work is seen, that it matters, and that it is all for a greater cause.
Second, we need to decentralize the operations of the organization. Only this way will we be able to create ownership across the DAO and build an organization that is bigger than any of its members. Every single holder of an ATX DAO NFT is the owner of this organization and should feel empowered to act that way. This is our thing. This proposal addresses those two elements in an attempt to take ATX DAO to the next level. It is important to highlight, nonetheless, that this proposal will start bleeding out ATX DAO’s treasury in recognition for work and as a way to incentivize sustainable revenue streams for the organization. This proposal was written with full awareness of its impact on our financial models. At the proposed burn rate - including operational positions, monthly compensation pools, and monetization idea incentives - our runway is approximately 12 months.
It may well be the case that we reach the end of that runway and we have not been able to find a way to sustain the organization in the long term. By voting to pass this proposal, we must all be aware that this is a real possibility, and we must be fine with that outcome. Although, personally, I would rather have us die a glorious death in an attempt to do something big than be too conservative and face a slow death by lack of engagement.
It is time to go big or go home.
